Two Wake-Up Calls for European Security

Two wake-up calls shifted the conversation in European security, the first military and the second political. First, in February 2022, Russia launched a multipronged invasion of Ukraine, with the intent of altering its perceived sphere of influence. Consequently, European officials came to understand the severity of the Russian threat to European security and the weaponry necessary to deter future aggression.

Second, Trump’s return to office revives a U.S. foreign policy that sees NATO as a poor investment with inadequate burden sharing rather than a credible strategic deterrent. The uncertainty of America’s commitment to Europe, combined with the transactionalism highlighted by the US-Ukraine minerals agreement, prompts European officials to promote a strategic compass. This approach seeks to rebalance defense efforts – not with the aim of replacing the US, but to realize NATO through burden-sharing that preserves the deterrence guaranteed by Article 5.

Considering these systemic shocks, the article examines two interconnected aspects of Europe’s defense: its indigenous industrial base capacity and a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US nuclear umbrella. Each reflects Europe’s drive for greater self-reliance in the event that U.S. commitments waver. Moreover, both aspects have contemporary models reconfiguring European Defense strategy.

Indigenous Industrial Defense

Euro-shoring aims to embed supply chains within the Eurozone by investing in capital-scarce partners with greater risk tolerance, given their elevated threat assessment of Russian aggression. Differing threat perceptions driven by geography and historical experience under Russian or Soviet control have created uneven priorities for industrial defense cooperation across European capitals. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, previous threat assessment gaps closed, creating opportunities for better-resourced Western European States to offshore industrial development in Central European and Baltic states.

This is exemplified by German and French firms’ initiatives to develop ammunition plants in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania, which aim to friend-shore their supply chains while bolstering European-wide production. Moreover, this bilateral cooperation leverages the freedom of capital within Eurozone regulations, thereby enhancing bilateral initiatives within a broader institutional framework.      

These “Euro-shoring” initiatives offer high-impact opportunities for defence-related expenditure while boosting production capacity within NATO. However, munitions production alone is insufficient to equip Europe with the capacity to deter future Russian aggression. Additional industrial collaboration will be necessary.

Reducing Dependence on U.S. Platforms

The unpredictability of procuring American platforms has created an opportunity for Euro-shored defense firms to develop more resilient and interoperable systems. This shift comes despite NATO’s historic reliance on American air defense superiority, exemplified by the Patriot as the most widely used air defense system in Europe.

The procurement of these systems requires immense trust between the producer and recipient states, as they require ongoing training, routine maintenance, and continuous replacement of spare parts to operate in the long term. However, the risk that reliance on American air defense could be leveraged to influence allied decision-making has reinforced European efforts to diversify their procurement.

Although Israeli air defense systems offer a high-quality, historically integrable, and readily available alternative, the current Danish procurement debate highlights that availability and NATO-wide interoperability are priorities in procurement policy, leading Denmark to favor European systems over both US and Israeli systems.

Considering the risk of US unpredictability, the SAMP/T produced by the Eurosam joint venture presents a competitive European alternative that’s operationally inferior to the Patriot in medium-range air defense, but less risky to procure in urgent time frames.

Moreover, the Eurosam project, led by the French defense giant THALES and multinational MBDA ( Airbus, BAE Systems, and Leonardo), underscores the value of industrial cooperation as a means to bolster indigenous production capacity, reduce contemporary risks of uncertainty in US commitments, and preserve NATO-wide interoperability, all without crossing political non-starters of deeper EU integration.

Although the June 2025 NATO summit and surge of US air defense systems to Europe suggest that the risk of American abandonment may be inflated, the friction is more contingent on the burden-sharing of defense spending. However, Trump’s presidency has introduced enough uncertainty to compel Europeans to redesign their industrial defence as resilient as possible to the risks of unpredictability and transactionalism. 

Strategic Nuclear Deterrent

The growing uncertainty surrounding the future of American security guarantees under the current Trump administration has prompted European officials to question whether it’s necessary to develop a nuclear deterrent independent of the US nuclear umbrella.

The foundation of NATO’s strategic posture has historically rested on US security assurances and forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe to provide strategic depth and deter Soviet and Russian aggression. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) serves as the primary forum for informing and consulting member states on nuclear policy, force posture, and deterrent scenarios. While the institution functions based on consensus, ultimate authority over the use of U.S. nuclear weapons assigned to NATO lies solely with the American president.

Therefore, the NPG de facto provides a forum for European interests to be considered upstream for US global-oriented nuclear policy and consult European partners downstream about decisions that impact European security. Although the structure and function of the NPG enhance the alliance’s cohesion and improve peacetime signaling, the deterrent is vulnerable to the quality of American credibility without alternative points of failure.

To maintain strategic independence from the credibility dilemma, France deliberately refrains from participating in the NPG, thereby preserving its independent nuclear doctrine and retaining autonomy over its nuclear deterrent, known as the force de dissuasion. Ironically, this independence makes it the most viable option to partially offset the uncertainties of contemporary American strategic commitments.

France as the Core Alternative

Although French nuclear forces can close the gaps, national capabilities fall short of a credible nuclear deterrent. Politically and economically, France’s future is firmly intertwined with that of continental Europe, thereby strengthening French nuclear credibility through alignment of shared interests. Moreover, Macron’s announcement to open a discussion on France’s nuclear umbrella for “deterrence of our allies” received positive endorsements from European leaders and received favorable public support, with  59% of those surveyed believing that “it is in France’s interest to protect other European countries, particularly with nuclear weapons.” 

However, the current imbalanced nuclear triad isn’t optimally equipped for signaling against a superior nuclear power. France’s 290 nuclear weapons are overwhelmingly on the naval leg of the triad, with 280 deployed to Triomphant-class submarines, accompanied by 50 air-launched cruise missiles deliverable by Rafale fighters.

Currently, French nuclear forces are sufficient to deter a surprise nuclear attack, as submarines excel in stealth and survivability, thereby maintaining a second-strike capability. However, France must develop visible and credible air and land-based capabilities with multiple points of failure to signal effectively.

Moreover, France’s nuclear doctrine is ambiguous, including a “final warning” policy authorizing first use to signal resolve against vaguely defined vital interests. However, this doctrine isn’t congruent with the French arsenal, as they reportedly don’t possess tactical low-yield nuclear weapons, which would be optimal for first-use scenarios.

Therefore, using first-use threats and strategic nuclear weapons to deter aggression risks counter-threats of mutually assured destruction (MAD), and ultimately undermines the credibility of the initial threat. Although Macron’s initiative is a profound signal to improve European cohesion, France’s operational gaps and self-exclusion from the NPG raise doubts about its ability to credibly guarantee its own nuclear intentions, let alone those of its allies.    

Why the UK Falls Short    

The United Kingdom’s industrial and operational reliance on the US doesn’t offer added value to strategic deterrence. Industrially, the backbone of Britain’s nuclear-capable Trident missiles isn’t owned by the UK but instead built and maintained in coordination with the US. More importantly, British nuclear targeting relies on American satellite systems. In addition, like France, the UK is almost entirely dependent on the naval leg of its triad, with no land-based systems and only a nominal air-based strike capacity.

Moreover, even if the UK could industrially and operationally decouple itself from the US, British nuclear doctrine is currently assigned to the defense of NATO; thus, untangling this commitment from NATO to an alternative Franco-British nuclear umbrella may undermine alliance cohesion.

Nevertheless, the imbalanced triad and non-integrable nuclear doctrines suggest that despite the Northwood Declaration, bilateral Franco-British efforts are unlikely to replace the contemporary American nuclear umbrella without large-scale investment and significant changes to their respective nuclear forces.

A Strategic Pivot for European Defence

The starting gun has been fired, and Europe is on the clock to define its future defense. However, a rebalanced and credible European security architecture must be built on politically feasible solutions below the threshold of deeper EU integration. At the same time, it must be capable of deterring Russian aggression within the Kremlin’s perceived sphere of influence, and structurally resilient to contemporary risks associated with American transactionalism. Eurosam and the Northwood Declaration are necessary first political and industrial signals that interlink independent solutions with critical interests.

European defense planners must adjust their investment and procurement policies, shifting focus from NATO-wide to a continent-wide comparative advantage. Therefore, maximizing the benefits of an integrated European market will facilitate the growth of the industrial base. Moreover, this shift presents an opportunity for mid-sized defense firms to specialize in addressing pressing European needs, thereby filling gaps previously dominated by American suppliers.

From National Independence to Collective Guarantees    

When Macron proposed that France would consult with its allies about its nuclear posture, it fundamentally altered France’s strategic commitments – both to its allies and to adversaries. Thus, if France is serious about transforming its nuclear policy from one based on national independence to that of a strategic guarantor, then it ought to join the NPG and dramatically redesign its nuclear doctrine and posture to fit this role. France can still retain exclusive authority over the use of their nuclear weapons in the NPG, just as the US has, while providing additional fail-safes to preserve the credibility of Article 5 amid fear of American abandonment.

A new, rebalanced defense architecture will require high-impact, ad-hoc approaches that are interoperable with established institutions, collectively raising the floor for all stakeholders. However, the architecture must be driven by national players as long as the political appetite for deeper EU integration is absent. Thus, Baltic and Central European states with higher threat assessments of Russian aggression and a greater political appetite for action will likely shape the architecture of European defense, provided their initiatives are backed by German and French support and interoperable with established institutions.