At a Crossroads: Political Uncertainty and the Middle Corridor’s Future

As the Russian war in Ukraine reshapes global trade dynamics and disruptions in maritime shipping expose vulnerabilities in traditional supply chains, an alternative transit route is gaining momentum: the Middle Corridor. This multimodal trade route connects China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey, bypassing Russia entirely. Positioned as a crucial overland link between China and Europe, this corridor has emerged as a response to shifting geopolitical dynamics and the need for greater resilience in Eurasian trade.

This article, the third in our four-part series, explores the rising significance of the Middle Corridor and the factors driving its development. We begin by analysing why this alternative route is gaining traction. We then define the scope of the Middle Corridor, examining ongoing developments while highlighting its strategic role and potential to strengthen Eurasian connectivity.

However, despite its potential, the corridor faces a closing window of opportunity, as infrastructure gaps, financing constraints, and geopolitical uncertainties could limit its long-term viability. Finally, we assess the political risks that could derail its momentum and determine whether the Middle Corridor is truly on the path to becoming a sustainable and competitive trade route.

The Rise of the Middle Corridor: A Strategic Necessity

The Middle Corridor has emerged as a critical trade route in response to growing geopolitical instability and the need for greater resilience in Eurasian trade. While long-term factors have contributed to the corridor’s development—including the global push for infrastructure investment, China’s effort to diversify through land-based trade routes, the potential to streamline transit times, and the ambitions of transit states—its recent rise has been driven by more immediate pressures. Chief among them are Russia’s declining role as a logistics hub and growing vulnerabilities in global maritime trade.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has severely undermined its role as a logistics hub. Western sanctions have restricted the transit of goods through its territory and cut off access to foreign capital and technology vital for railway maintenance and upgrades. As a result, rail bottlenecks have worsened, expansion projects have stalled, and Russia’s viability as a China-Europe transit corridor has declined. Consequently, China-Europe trade has increasingly shifted to alternative overland routes, particularly the Middle Corridor.

Previously, the Northern Corridor—the primary rail link connecting China to Western Europe via Russia and Belarus—was a critical artery for Eurasian trade. However, since the war began, it has become a liability, plagued by cargo seizures, insurance complications, and compliance concerns. Freight volumes along the Northern Route dropped by 56% in the first half of 2023, compared to the same period in 2022, reflecting its declining attractiveness.

Beyond land routes, the war has also stalled the development of Russia’s maritime alternative, the Northern Sea Route—an Arctic passage designed to bypass the Suez Canal and shorten shipping times. Western sanctions have severely restricted Russia’s ability to build and maintain icebreakers, essential for year-round navigation, while also deterring crucial Chinese investment needed to develop the route’s infrastructure.

Simultaneously, the Southern Corridor—which connects China to Europe via the Indian Ocean—faces mounting challenges. The 2021 Suez Canal blockage and ongoing Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea have underscored the corridor’s vulnerabilities, leading to a 50% drop in transit volumes. While the Suez Canal incident highlighted the risks of chokepoint dependence, the Houthi attacks have escalated security concerns and driven up insurance costs. Meanwhile, rising tensions in the South China Sea and the looming risk of a Taiwan conflict further threaten the corridor’s long-term viability.

With both the Northern and Southern Corridors facing severe disruptions, the Middle Corridor has emerged as a strategic alternative. While some freight has been rerouted through other transport methods or around the Cape of Good Hope, a substantial share remains unabsorbed and is increasingly shifting toward this overland route. As a result, the Middle Corridor is gaining traction as a key transit artery, offering a viable means to bypass Russian territory and enhance logistical resilience in Eurasian trade.

What Is the Middle Corridor, and Why Is It Central to Eurasian Connectivity

The Middle Corridor has become a key trade and transit network connecting China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caucasus, and either the Black Sea or Turkey. While often equated with the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), it represents a broader geopolitical and logistical framework. It integrates multiple transport routes aimed at enhancing connectivity, trade efficiency, and strategic resilience across the Eurasian continent.

At the heart of the Middle Corridor, the TITR facilitates freight movement between China and Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, before continuing through either the Black Sea or Turkey. Managed by the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association, the TITR provides a formalized coordination mechanism between rail, port, and logistics operators along this route. Recent years have seen substantial growth in cargo volumes, with freight transported via the TITR increasing 2.5 times to 1.5 million tons in 2022, reaching 2 million tons in the first nine months of 2023, and further rising to 4.1 million tons by November 2024. The World Bank projects that, with the necessary infrastructure improvements, the corridor's tonnage could reach 11 million by 2030, underscoring its potential to absorb a larger share of Eurasian trade flows.

Significant infrastructure developments are underway both within and beyond the institutionalized TITR framework. Among the most notable, Kazakhstan is actively addressing bottlenecks and expanding its railway network to enhance capacity along its section of the corridor. In November 2024, Azerbaijan, China and Kazakhstan, announced plans to establish an intermodal cargo terminal at the Port of Alat in Baku, further strengthening its role as a logistics hub. Meanwhile, in October 2024, Georgia began construction of the Anaklia Deep-Sea Port, a key project aimed at enhancing Black Sea shipping capacity and improving the TITR’s maritime connectivity.

Beyond the TITR framework, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are advancing the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, a project set to connect with Turkmenistan and offer an alternative to the Kazakh segment of the Middle Corridor. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan seeks to integrate its Nakhchivan exclave, considering two routes: the Zangezur Corridor via Armenia to Turkey or the Arax Corridor via Iran to Turkey, bypassing Armenia. While these projects introduce greater competition, they also strengthen the corridor’s connectivity and strategic importance, reinforcing its role in Eurasian trade.

The Middle Corridor’s potential linkages with other infrastructure corridors could extend its reach both east-west and north-south, establishing it as a key junction within Eurasia’s logistics network. Eastward, integration with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) via the CKU railway or the Lapis Lazuli Corridor through Afghanistan and Turkmenistan could strengthen ties with South Asia and, in the long term, Southeast Asia. Southward, a connection to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) via Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, or Central Asia would create alignment with Russia, Iran, and India.

The ongoing expansion of the TITR, the development of alternative routes, and the integration of complementary transport corridors are significantly enhancing the Middle Corridor’s viability and strategic importance. By broadening its connectivity, it is evolving not only into a key transit route but also into a vital regional economic corridor. This transformation reinforces its role as a critical Eurasian trade artery while potentially reducing opposition from previously excluded countries such as Russia and Iran, as increased interconnectivity creates shared economic and logistical benefits.

While Russia does not directly benefit from the Middle Corridor, it can still leverage its development to reroute goods away from Ukrainian-targeted Siberian railways or to circumvent sanctions via Central Asian economies—a trend already underway. Additionally, linking the Middle Corridor with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) would allow Russia to enhance trade access to the Indian Ocean via Iran and Azerbaijan, providing an indirect incentive for engagement rather than outright opposition.

Challenges and Constraints: Navigating the Middle Corridor’s Closing Window of Opportunity

Despite its growing geopolitical relevance and economic potential, the Middle Corridor faces a narrowing window of opportunity. While current geopolitical circumstances—sanctions on Russia and disruptions to maritime trade—have created favourable conditions for its expansion, its long-term viability depends on addressing critical logistical and infrastructural constraints before competition from the Northern and Southern Corridors resurfaces.

The Middle Corridor faces structural limitations that reduce its competitiveness against the Northern Corridor, which—before sanctions—was faster, cheaper, and better integrated, and the Southern Corridor, which remains a lower-cost maritime alternative. While sanctions have increased interest in the Middle Corridor, its long-term success depends on resolving key logistical and infrastructural constraints. Though it has the potential to offer faster transit times, multi-modal complexity, frequent transshipments, and inefficient customs procedures currently undermine efficiency and drive up costs. Infrastructure bottlenecks further restrict trade flows, preventing the corridor from fully absorbing rerouted volumes from Russia. Without these improvements, the Middle Corridor will remain a slower, costlier, and less integrated alternative, limiting its long-term viability.

Addressing these challenges demands substantial investment, particularly from China, the EU, and international financial institutions. While regional actors view the corridor as a long-term economic initiative, external investors see it both as an opportunity for trade diversification and a geopolitical hedge amid current disruptions. Infrastructure projects such as the Anaklia Port, set to be operational by 2029, and the CKU railway, expected in 2031, illustrate the risk that geopolitical shifts may alter investment priorities before critical infrastructure is completed. If significant progress is not achieved before conditions change—such as a potential reopening of the Northern Corridor—funding and interest could decline, leaving the Middle Corridor underdeveloped and struggling to compete.

Even with significant improvements, the Middle Corridor may remain primarily a regional trade corridor, rather than a dominant intercontinental route. In the first half of 2023, its volumes represented just 18% of those on the Northern Corridor, and even in an optimized scenario, the World Bank projects that by 2030, intercontinental trade will only make up around 40% of its total volume.

While the Middle Corridor is unlikely to be abandoned, its long-term viability hinges on securing sustained investment and enhancing operational efficiency before geopolitical conditions shift. Without these advancements, it risks becoming a secondary transit route rather than a competitive alternative to existing corridors. Beyond economic and logistical challenges, however, escalating political risks could present an even greater threat, jeopardizing not only its role as an international trade artery but also its function as a regional economic corridor.

Uncertain Terrain: Political Risks Threatening the Middle Corridor’s Future

Beyond logistical and investment challenges, the Middle Corridor faces political risks that could stall progress and deter external funding. While Central Asia has seen increasing stability, with the resolution of the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border dispute and Turkmenistan’s growing role in regional transit after a long period of isolation, the South Caucasus remains volatile, shaped by political shifts in Georgia, developments in Abkhazia, and the fragile Armenia- Azerbaijan peace process. How these dynamics unfold will be crucial to the corridor’s development and long-term viability.

Georgia’s political trajectory poses a significant risk to the Middle Corridor, as the country faces growing isolation from the West. With sanctions in place and stronger measures under discussion, Georgia is losing Western financial support, while FDI has declined amid economic uncertainty. This instability extends to infrastructure financing, particularly as some Western countries, including Germany, have halted development projects. While both Georgia and the EU seek the corridor’s success, closer ties with Russia could strain EU relations further, while deeper engagement with Iran and China risks alienating the US. The potential involvement of a US-sanctioned Chinese company in the Anaklia port project further complicates matters, raising concerns that it could become entangled in broader US-China geopolitical tensions.

A second major risk stems from the evolving dynamics between Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia. With rising instability in Abkhazia, amid strained Russian-Abkhazian relations and Georgia eyeing the reintegration of its separatist territories, tensions could escalate. Any conflict could have serious repercussions for Georgia and the Middle Corridor, particularly given the precedent of the 2008 August War, when Russian forces seized the port of Poti, enforced a naval blockade and destroyed a key railway bridge, temporarily paralysing Georgia’s railway system. The stakes are now even higher as Russia constructs a naval base, just 40 km from Anaklia, to shield its Black Sea fleet from Ukrainian strikes. While Anaklia itself is not a direct military target, the proximity of the Russian base increases the risk of collateral damage, threatening Black Sea shipping and complicating the port’s long-term development. These risks could undermine investor confidence and disrupt Georgia’s role in the Middle Corridor.

The third major risk stems from the ongoing peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose outcome could significantly impact the Middle Corridor’s development. A comprehensive peace agreement could facilitate greater regional connectivity, particularly if the long-closed Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan borders reopen and infrastructure projects like the Zangezur Corridor move forward. Although the text of the peace agreement has been agreed upon, Azerbaijan insists it will only finalise the deal if Armenia amends its constitution to remove language it considers a claim on Azerbaijani territory – a move seen by Armenian politicians as an as a pretext to sabotage the peace agreement. Prime Minister Pashinyan has signalled willingness to amend the constitution, but any change must clear a national referendum—requiring both a majority of votes cast and support from at least 25 per cent of all registered voters, an obstacle that could prove difficult to overcome. With Pashinyan’s declining approval ratings and the 2026 elections approaching—potentially reviving Karabakh-focused nationalism—the window for concluding the peace agreement may be closing. This domestic uncertainty is compounded by continued rearmament and mutual accusations of ceasefire violations, keeping tensions high and the risk of renewed conflict alive.

The Road Ahead: Fragile Momentum and the Corridor’s Uncertain Future

This analysis underscores that even if the Middle Corridor secures the necessary investment and overcomes logistical constraints before geopolitical conditions shift, its long-term viability remains exposed to significant political risks. These uncertainties could still disrupt its progress, reinforcing the need for continuous monitoring and strategic adaptability to evolving regional dynamics.

The Middle Corridor’s future hinges on its ability to transition from a geopolitical necessity to a logistically and economically viable alternative. While investment and infrastructure development can address many of its current inefficiencies, its long-term success is not guaranteed. The corridor remains vulnerable to shifting geopolitical alignments, political instability in key transit states, and the potential re-emergence of competing routes. If these challenges are not managed effectively, the Middle Corridor risks becoming a secondary transit option rather than a transformative trade artery. However, if regional actors and external stakeholders—particularly China and the EU—commit to sustained investment and coordination, the corridor could cement its role as a resilient and competitive trade route, fundamentally reshaping Eurasian connectivity.